How can di¤erent individuals'probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Although there are several classic results on this problem, they all assume that the 'agenda'of relevant events forms a -algebra, hence, is closed under taking disjunctions (unions) or conjunctions (intersections) of events. This assumption is overly demanding: in practice, the group might care about the probability of 'rain'and that of 'heat'while ignoring that of 'rain or heat'. We drop this assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. We characterize linear pooling and neutral pooling for general agendas, with classic results emerging as special cases if the agenda is taken to be a -algebra. We apply our results to probabilistic preference aggregation (re-interpretable as fuzzy or vague preference aggregation). This paper is the …rst of two self-contained, but technically related companion papers inspired from judgment aggregation theory.
Introduction
This paper addresses the classic problem of probabilistic opinion pooling: di¤erent individuals'probability assignments to some events are to be aggregated into a collective probability assignment, while preserving probabilistic coherence. Although opinion pooling has been explored in some depth by statisticians, economists, and philosophers, almost all contributions so far assume that the set of events under consideration -the agenda -forms a -algebra. That is, the agenda must be closed under both negation (complement) of events and countable disjunction (union) of events. But in real-life applications it is perfectly possible that two events are under consideration -i.e., their probabilities are required -but their disjunction is not. The group might consider whether it will rain, and whether the interest rate will rise, without considering the disjunction 'it will rain or the interest rate will rise'. The assumption that the agenda forms a -algebra is of course technically convenient: indeed, -algebras are the kind of structures on which probability measures are de…ned, so that, by taking the agenda to be a -algebra, one can view opinion pooling as the aggregation of probability measures. But technical convenience is no ultimate justi…cation. Expert committees, for example, often do not assign probabilities to all events of an entire -algebra; rather, they often care only about a limited set of relevant events which is not closed under taking disjunctions (let alone countably in…nite disjunctions).
There are essentially two reasons for which a disjunction of relevant events (or another combination of relevant events such as a conjunction or a disjunction of negations of conjunctions) may itself be irrelevant, i.e., not considered in the group's opinion pooling problem. Either the probability of such 'arti…cial'composite events is simply uninteresting. Or the individuals are unable to come up with subjective probabilities of these complicated events, so that these events must be excluded from consideration. To see why it can be hard to form a probabilistic opinion on a combination of 'basic'events -such as 'rain or heat'-note that it does not su¢ ce to form a probabilistic opinion on each underlying basic event: all sorts of probabilistic dependencies between these basic events also matter to the probability of the combined event, and these dependencies can be hard to assess as they depend on complex causal interconnections in the world (such as causal e¤ects between the basic events and common causes to these events).
We investigate opinion pooling for a general agenda, which may but need not form a -algebra. Our general notion of an agenda is imported from judgment aggregation theory (e.g., List and Pettit 2002 , Dietrich 2006 , Dietrich and List 2007 , 2013a , Nehring and Puppe 2010 , Dietrich and Mongin 2010 , Dokow and Holzman 2010 , Nehring, Pivato and Puppe 2013 . We impose two axiomatic requirements on probabilistic opinion pooling: the familiar 'independence'condition (whereby the collective probability of any event depends solely on the individual probabilities of this event), and a condition of respecting unanimity. We essentially prove two results:
Firstly, for a large class of agendas -including -algebras as very special cases -any opinion pooling function satisfying our axiomatic conditions must be linear: the collective probability of each event in the agenda must be a weighted linear average of the individuals'probabilities of that event, where the weights are the same for all events. When applied to -algebra agendas, this results reduces to the classic characterization of linear pooling, as referenced below. Secondly, for an even larger class of agendas, the same axiomatic conditions lead to the weaker conclusion of neutral pooling, i.e., the collective probability of each event in the agenda must be some (possibly non-linear) function of the individuals'probabilities of that event, where the function is the same for each event.
Each of these two results is given in three variants, which di¤er in the precise way of respecting unanimity and the precise class of agendas.
To give an idea of the generality of our results, let us mention that some of them even apply to agendas containing only logically independent events such as 'rain' and 'heat' (and their negations such as 'no rain' and 'no heat'), without containing disjunctions or conjunctions of these events. Such agendas without interconnections between events are frequent in practice, where the events considered are often at most probabilistically dependent (i.e., correlated), not logically dependent. These agendas di¤er fundamentally from agendas which form aalgebra and are thus full of interconnections. By focusing on -algebras alone, the standard treatments of opinion pooling have therefore excluded many realistic applications.
As an important application of opinion pooling on general agendas, we consider probabilistic preference aggregation. Here each individual submits subjective probabilities of events of the form 'x is better than y', where x and y belong to some given set of alternatives. So, individuals submit probabilistic beliefs about what is 'better' in some given sense, e.g., what job candidates are more quali…ed. (A re-interpretation in terms of vague or fuzzy preferences is also possible.) We show that some of our linearity or neutrality results apply to probabilistic preference aggregation, and lead to new …ndings. Each of our linearity or neutrality results (with one exception) is tight: the linearity or neutrality conclusion follows if and only if the agenda falls into a relevant class of agendas. In other words, we fully characterize the kind of agendas ('pooling problems') for which one is led to linear or neutral aggregation. Our paper therefore follows the modern approach of axiomatic judgment aggregation theory which indeed consists in characterizing the agendas leading to certain aggregation (im)possibilities. This approach, which was introduced in judgment aggregation theory by Nehring and Puppe (2010) , is now put to work in probabilistic opinion pooling theory.
For the classical case in which the agenda is a -algebra, linearity and neutrality are among the most widely studied properties of opinion pooling functions (in the case of neutrality sometimes under names such as strong label neutrality or strong setwise function property). Linear pooling goes back to Stone (1961) or even Laplace, and neutral pooling to McConway (1981) and Wagner (1982) . Linear pooling functions are well-known to be the only pooling functions which satisfy independence and respect unanimities, provided the -algebra contains more than four events; see Aczél and Wagner (1980) and McConway (1981) . Our linearity results generalizes this classic theorem to general agendas. For other extensions of (or alternatives to) the classic linearity characterization, see for instance Wagner (1982 Wagner ( /1985 , Aczél, Ng and Wagner (1984) , Genest (1984) , Mongin (1995) and Chambers (2007) , all of which retain the assumption that the agenda is a -algebra. Agendas of the -algebra type have the interesting feature that every neutral pooling function is automatically linear, so that neutrality and linearity are equivalent here, again as long as the -algebra contains more than four events (McConway 1981 and Wagner 1982) . This peculiarity does not carry over to general agendas: many agendas allow for neutral yet non-linear opinion pooling.
The reader is referred to Genest and Zidek's (1986) overview article for an excellent review of classical results on opinion pooling. For opinion pooling under asymmetric information, see Dietrich (2010) . For the aggregation of qualitative rather than quantitative probabilities, see Weymark (1997) . For a computational (and non-axiomatic) approach to the aggregation of partial probability assignments, where individuals do not assign probabilities to all events in the underlying -algebra, see Osherson and Vardi (2006) .
The framework
We consider a group of n 2 individuals, labelled i = 1; :::; n, who have to assign collective probabilities to some relevant events.
The agenda. Formally, let be a non-empty set of possible worlds (or states). Each subset A of is an event; its complement ('negation') is denoted A c := nA. Those events which are relevant -i.e., on which collective beliefs are to be formed -make up the agenda. There can be two reasons for excluding some events from the agenda: either they are simply not of interest, or the individuals are unable to provide probabilities of these events. Formally, an agenda is simply a non-empty set X of events which is closed under taking complements, i.e., A 2 X ) A c 2 X. Simple examples are agendas of the form X = fA; A c g or X = fA; A c ; B; B c g (where the events A and B might or might not be logically interrelated). Crucially, we allow an agenda to contain A and B without containing the disjunctive event A[B (or conjunctive event A\B): it may be relevant whether global warming will continue, and relevant whether the recession will continue, yet irrelevant (or too hard to assess) whether global warming or the recession will continue. Our only requirement on the agenda is closedness under taking complements -a natural condition since whenever the probability of an event is of interest or possible to assess, so is presumably the probability of its negation.
A concrete agenda containing no conjunctive or disjunctive events. Suppose each possible world is speci…ed by a vector of three binary characteristics. The …rst takes the value 1 if CO 2 emissions are above some critical threshold, and 0 otherwise. The second takes the value 1 if there is a mechanism whereby if CO 2 emissions are above that threshold, then Arctic summers are ice-free, and 0 otherwise. The third takes the value 1 if Arctic summers are ice-free, and 0 otherwise. Thus the set of possible worlds is the set of all triples of 0s and 1s, excluding the (inconsistent) triple in which the …rst and second characteristics are 1 and the third is 0, i.e., = f0; 1g 3 nf(1; 1; 0)g. We can now imagine an expert committee faced with the problem of agreeing on probabilities of the events in the agenda X consisting of A; A ! B; B and their complements, where A is the event of a positive …rst characteristic, A ! B the event of a positive second characteristic, 2 and B the event of a positive third characteristic. Although there are non-trivial overlaps and connections between these three events (note that A and A ! B are inconsistent with B c ), the agenda contains no conjunctions or disjunctions.
Opinions. Unlike judgment aggregation theory (in which opinions are binary), probability aggregation theory has so far focused on those special agendas which form a -algebra, i.e., are closed under taking the complement of an event and the union of (countably many) events, and hence also the intersection of (countably many) events. Though often unrealistic, such agendas are technically convenient since probability functions are de…ned on -algebras. Formally, a probability function on a -algebra of events is a function P : ! [0; 1] such that P ( ) = 1 and P is -additive (i.e., P (A 1 [ A 2 [ :::) = P (A 1 ) + P (A 2 ) + ::: for every sequence of pairwise disjoint events A 1 ; A 2 ; ::: 2 ). In the context of an arbitrary agenda X, we shall talk of 'opinion functions'rather than 'probability functions'. Formally, given an agenda X, an opinion function is a function P : X ! [0; 1] which is coherent, i.e., extendible to a probability function on the -algebra generated by X. This -algebra is denoted (X) and de…ned as the smallest -algebra which includes X. It can be constructed by simply closing X under (countable) unions and complements, i.e., adding any combinations of agenda events formed using (countable) unions and complements. So, whenever X contains A; B, then
c [ B, and so on. Often, (X) is simply the set 2 of all events, as all events are constructible from agenda events. In our CO 2 emissions example, an opinion function can not assign probability 2 Note that A ! B ('if A then B') represents a non-material conditional, since it is for instance consistent to negate A and also A ! B (i.e., A c \ (A ! B) c 6 = ?). A material conditional, by contrast, is always true if its antecedent is false. The only assignment of truth-values to the events A; A ! B and B that is ruled out is (1; 1; 0). If we wanted to re-interpret ! as a material conditional, we would have to rule out in addition the truth-value assignments (0; 0; 0), (0; 0; 1) and (1; 0; 1), which would make little sense for our expert committee. The event A ! B would become
, and the agenda would no longer be free from conjunctions or disjunctions. However, the agenda would still not be a -algebra. For non-material conditionals, see for instance Priest (2001). one to each of the events A, A ! B and B c : this would be incoherent since
We write P X for the set of all opinion functions for agenda X. Note that if X happens to be a -algebra, P X is simply the set of all probability functions on X.
Pooling the opinions. Given the agenda X, a combination of opinion functions across the n individuals, (P 1 ; :::; P n ), is called a pro…le. An opinion pooling function -for short pooling function -is a function F : P n X ! P X , which assigns to each pro…le (P 1 ; :::; P n ) of individual opinion functions a collective opinion function P = F (P 1 ; :::; P n ), often denoted P P 1 ;:::;Pn for short. For instance, P P 1 ;:::;Pn could be the arithmetic average 1 n P 1 + ::: + 1 n P n . But there are of course numerous other examples. Linear and neutral pooling functions are of particular interest. The idea is familiar from the literature. We call the pooling function linear if there exist 'weights'w 1 ; :::; w n 0 with sum 1 such that, for every pro…le (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 2 P n X ,
or in short, P P 1 ;:::;Pn = X n i=1 w i P i . In the extreme case that w i = 1 for some 'expert'i, we obtain an expert rule given by P P 1 ;:::;Pn = P i .
More generally, we call the pooling function neutral if there exists a (possibly non-linear) function D : [0; 1] n ! [0; 1] such that, for every pro…le (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 2 P n X , P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D(P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)) for all A 2 X:
We call D the local pooling criterion. Since it does not depend on the event A, all events are treated perfectly symmetrically (which explains the term 'neutral'). Linearity is the special case in which D is given by a weighted linear average
Notice that, while every combination of weights w 1 ; :::; w n 0 with sum 1 de…nes a proper linear pooling rule (since any linear average of opinion functions is an opinion function), it is far from clear whether a given non-linear function D : [0; 1] n ! [0; 1] de…nes a proper pooling function, since (1) might not de…ne an opinion function. Whether there actually exist any neutral but non-linear pooling functions depends crucially on the agenda in question, as will turn out. In the classical case of a -algebra agenda, the answer is well-known to be negative (as long as the -algebra contains more than four events). We shall identify many agendas for which the answer is positive.
Some further terminology. An event A is contingent if it is neither ? (impossible) nor (necessary). A set S of events is consistent if its intersection \ A2S A is non-empty, and inconsistent otherwise; S entails another event B if the intersection of S is included in B (i.e., \ A2S A B).
Two classes of applications
One may distinguish between two broad classes of applications. The group could be interested in either of the following:
(a) the probabilities of certain propositions (statements) of natural language, such as 'it will rain'or 'the new legislation X will be rejected by the constitutional court'; (b) the distribution of a certain real-valued (or vector-valued) random variable, such as the number of insurance claims over a given period, or tomorrow's price of a given share, or the height of a randomly picked Russian citizen.
Arguably, our approach of a general agenda is more relevant to application (a) than application (b). As has emerged from our discussion, application (a) leads to a natural-language agenda X which does typically not form a full -algebra. It would usually be inappropriate to replace X by the -algebra (X), because many events in (X) represent complex and arti…cial combinations of the more basic events contained in X. Indeed, (X) is often enormous but …nite: if X contains (among others) k logically independent events, then (X) contains (at least) 2 2 k events, hence has a size which grows double-exponentially in k.
3 Unless k is small, (X) is far too large for being used as the agenda, since real people can hardly submit -indeed hold -subjective probabilities over so many events (and even if they can, the group might not be interested in all these probabilities).
By contrast, application (b) often leads to a classical -algebra agenda -not only because the group may simply need no less than a full probability distribution over a -algebra, but also because people may often be able to submit such a full distribution. For instance, a stock analyst asked to estimate the distribution of tomorrow's price of the Apple share might decide to submit a log-normal distribution, which leaves him 'only'with the task of coming up with two parameters (the mean and the variance of the exponential of the share price). Opinion pooling problems of type (b) are discussed in more detail in the companion paper Dietrich and List (2013b) , where they represent a principal application.
Axiomatic requirements on opinion pooling
We now introduce some natural conditions on pooling functions for a general agenda X. All these conditions are satis…ed by linear pooling functions. The …rst condition, independence, requires that the collective probability of each relevant event depend solely on the individual probabilities of that event. This condition corresponds to the equally named condition in the literature (sometimes also called weak setwise function property).
Independence. For each event A 2 X, there exists a function D A : [0; 1] n ! [0; 1] (the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D A (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)):
The main normative defence of independence is the democratic idea that the collective view on any issue should be determined by individual views on that issue. This re ‡ects a local, as opposed to holistic, notion of democracy; under a holistic notion, the collective view on an issue may also be in ‡uenced by individual views on other related issues. Such a defence of independence becomes less compelling if the agenda contains 'arti…cial'events, such as conjunctions of intuitively unrelated events. It would for instance seem inappropriate to require that the collective probability of the disjunctive event 'rain or heat'be determined locally, since this mean to forbid giving any attention to the individual probabilities of 'rain'and of 'heat'. The normative appeal of the independence condition thus relies crucially on our move towards general agendas rather than -algebras.
Apart from a normative defence, two pragmatic arguments for independence can be given, which apply regardless of the composition of the agenda. First, determining the collective view on any issue solely on the basis of the individual views on that issue is informationally and computationally less demanding than a holistic approach. Second, independence prevents certain types of agenda manipulation. 4 However, an objection against independence in the classical case that X is a -algebra is its incompatibility with collectively preserving unanimous beliefs of probabilistic independence (see Genest and Wagner 1984; Bradley, Dietrich and List 2006) . 5 Whether this objection also applies to our independence condition depends on the precise nature of the agenda. Finally, some authors reject independence -in the classical case that X is a -algebra and presumably also in our general case -as they prefer to require external Bayesianity, whereby aggregation should commute with Bayesian updating of probabilities in the light of new information.
Our next condition requires that a unanimous certainty of any event in the agenda be respected by the collective opinion function. 4 In the classical case that X is a -algebra, McConway (1981) shows that independence (his weak setwise function property) is equivalent to the marginalization property, which requires aggregation to commute with the operation of reducing the -algebra to some sub--algebra X. A similar result holds for general agendas X. Thus independence prevents agenda setters from in ‡uencing the collective probability assignment to some events by adding or removing other events to or from the agenda.
5 Assuming the aggregation function is non-dictatorial, i.e., the collective does not always adopt the probability function of a …xed individual.
Consensus preservation. For all A 2 X and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , if P i (A) = 1 for all individuals i then P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = 1.
This condition has immediate intuitive appeal. Like independence, it has a familiar counterpart in the classical case of a -algebra agenda (sometimes stated as a zero-probability preservation condition). The condition can in fact be strengthened by extending it to other kinds of certain beliefs. Let us …rst distinguish between three types of beliefs of an individual: Individual i's explicitly revealed beliefs are the beliefs about events in the agenda X. Such beliefs are directly expressed by the submitted opinion function P i . Individual i's implicitly revealed beliefs are given by any probabilities of events in (X)nX which follow from the explicitly revealed beliefs, i.e., which hold under any probability function extending the submitted opinion function P i to the -algebra (X). For instance, if P i assigns probability one to the 'rain'event A in the agenda X, then agent i explicitly reveals certainty of A, and implicitly reveals certainty of events B A not contained in the agenda. Individual i's unrevealed beliefs are any probabilistic beliefs about events in (X)nX which are privately held without being deducible from the submitted opinion function P i . Such beliefs are subjectively held without following from the submitted opinion function P i . For instance, if the individual is certain of the 'snow'event B outside the agenda, but the submitted opinion function P i is compatible with 'snow'having probability below one (i.e., P i (B) < 1 for some extension P i of P i to a probability function on (X)), then i's certainty of 'snow'is unrevealed.
Our …rst extension of consensus preservation extends the condition to implicitly revealed beliefs.
Implicit consensus preservation. For all A 2 (X) and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , if each P i implies certainty of A (i.e., P i (A) = 1 for every extension P i of P i to a probability function on (X)), then so does P P 1 ;:::;Pn .
Our second extension of consensus preservation requires the collective opinion function to be compatible with any unanimously held certainty of an eventincluding any unrevealed certainty, which does not follow from the submitted opinion functions but is merely possible based on these opinion functions.
Unrevealed consensus preservation. For all A 2 (X) and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , if each P i is consistent with certainty of A (i.e., P i (A) = 1 for some extension P i of P i to a probability function on (X)), then so is P P 1 ;:::;Pn .
Although these two extended consensus preservation conditions are less com-pelling than the original condition, they can be defended. Implicit consensus preservation ensures that whenever all individuals (perhaps implicitly) express certainty of an event A, then the collective opinion function does so too. Unrevealed consensus preservation ensures that the collective opinion function never overrules any unanimously held (revealed or unrevealed) certainty of an event. Why is this true? Suppose all submitted opinion functions P 1 ; :::; P n are compatible with certainty of event A, though perhaps also with smaller probabilities of A. Then it is possible, though perhaps not necessary, that all individuals are subjectively certain of A. The axiom requires the collective opinion function to be compatible with certainty of A. This requirement can be defended by the idea of respecting unanimities combined with a precautionary consideration. Indeed, since a unanimous certainty of A is possible, any cautious speci…cation of the collective opinion function makes this opinion function compatible with certainty of A -to ensure that a unanimous certainty, should it exist, has not been overruled. If a pooling function violates unrevealed consensus preservation and is used repeatedly to aggregate opinions, then, sooner or later, it will presumably overrule some (possibly unrevealed) unanimous certainty.
A third variant of consensus preservation is obtained by extending this condition to conditional beliefs. The idea is intuitive: if all individuals are certain of some event in the agenda given another, e.g., if they are all certain that there will be a famine given that there will be a civil war, or that there will be no civil war given that the economy will grow, then this belief should be preserved collectively. Note however that, given two agenda events A; B 2 X and an individual i's opinion function P i (where P i (B) 6 = 0), we cannot generally de…ne the conditional probability P i (AjB) = P i (A \ B)=P (B) since the event A \ B might be outside the agenda X; hence, we cannot generally know whether the individual is certain of A given B. But we can ask whether the individual could be certain of A given B, i.e., whether P i (AjB) = 1 for some extension P i of P i to a probability function on (X). In this case, the agent could hold a conditional certainty of A given B. Our next condition, conditional consensus preservation, requires that if each individual could be certain of A given B, then the collective opinion function should also be compatible with certainty of A given B. In fact, we require something subtly stronger: if each individual could be simultaneously certain of A given B, and of A 0 given B 0 , and of A 00 given B 00 etc. (for events A; B; A 0 ; B 0 ; A 00 ; B 00 ; ::: 2 X), then also the collective opinion function should be simultaneously compatible with all of these conditional certainties.
Conditional consensus preservation. For all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , and all …nite sets S of pairs (A; B) of events in X, if every opinion function P i is consistent with certainty of A given B for all (A; B) in S (i.e., some extension P i of P i to a probability function on (X) satis…es P i (AjB) = 1 for all pairs (A; B) 2 S such that P i (B) 6 = 0), then so is the collective opinion function P P 1 ;:::;Pn .
How are our three variants of the original consensus preservation condition related to the original condition, and to each other? The three variants imply the original condition, as is clear for implicit and unrevealed consensus preservation since in these conditions we may let A 2 X. Moreover the three variants are equivalent to the original condition in the classical case of a -algebra agenda, as is again clear for implicit and unrevealed consensus preservation since (X) = X. Further, unrevealed consensus preservation implies conditional consensus preservation (which is obvious if 2 X since then we may let S = f(A; )g). These relationships are summarized in the following result proved in Appendix A.8:
Proposition 1 (a) Each extended consensus preservation condition (i.e., implicit, unrevealed and conditional consensus preservation) implies consensus preservation, and is equivalent to it if the agenda X is classical, i.e., a -algebra. (b) Unrevealed consensus preservation implies conditional consensus preservation.
Each of our characterization results below employs consensus preservation either in its initial version or in one of its variants. The …rst variant (i.e., implicit consensus preservation) is however not used in any of our results; it has been stated for completeness. 5 When must pooling be neutral?
We now show that, for many agendas, the neutral pooling functions are the only independent pooling functions which respect consensus in an appropriate sense, namely in the sense of either consensus preservation, or conditional consensus preservation, or unrevealed consensus preservation. The stronger the consensus principle invoked, the wider the class of agendas for which neutrality follows from independence and the consensus principle. For now we leave aside the question of whether not just neutrality but even linearity follows; this question is addressed in the next section.
We start with the strongest of the three consensus principles, i.e., unrevealed consensus preservation. In this case, our characterization of neutral pooling holds for a wide class of agendas: all non-nested agendas. We call an agenda X nested if it has the form X = fA; A c : A 2 X + g for some set of events X + which is linearly ordered by set-inclusion, and non-nested otherwise. For example, binary agendas X = fA; A c g are nested: take X + := fAg, which is trivially linearly ordered by set-inclusion. Also, the agenda X = f( 1; t]; (t; 1) : t 2 Rg (for the set of worlds = R) is nested: take X + := f( 1; t] : t 2 Rg, which is linearly ordered by set-inclusion.
By contrast, any agenda consisting of multiple logically independent pairs A; A c is non-nested, i.e., X is non-nested if X = fA k ; A c k : k 2 Kg with jKj 2 such that every subset S X containing precisely one member of each pair fA k ; A c k g is consistent. As mentioned in the introduction, such agendas are of great practical importance because many decision-problems involve events that exhibit only probabilistic dependencies (i.e., correlations), but no logical ones. Another example of a non-nested agenda is the one in the expert committee example above, containing A, A ! B; B and their complements.
Theorem 1 (a) For any non-nested agenda X, all independent and unrevealed consensus preserving pooling functions F : P n X ! P X are neutral. (b) For any nested agenda X ( 6 = f?; g), some independent and unrevealed consensus preserving pooling function F : P n X ! P X is not neutral.
Part (b) shows that the agenda condition used in part (a) is tight: as soon as the agenda becomes nested, non-neutral 'solutions'emerge. However, these 'solutions'are non-neutral only in a limited sense: the pooling criterion D A , though not the same for all events A 2 X, must still be the same for all A 2 X + and the same for all A 2 XnX + , so that pooling is 'neutral within X + 'and 'neutral within XnX + '(with X + as de…ned above). This is clear from the proof.
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What happens if we weaken the condition of unrevealed consensus preservation to conditional consensus preservation in Theorem 1? Both parts of Theorem 1 continue to hold, where of course part (a) becomes a logically stronger claim, and part (b) a weaker claim. Let us state the modi…ed theorem explicitly:
Theorem 2 (a) For any non-nested agenda X, all independent and conditional consensus preserving pooling functions F : P n X ! P X are neutral. (b) For any nested agenda X ( 6 = f?; g), some independent and conditional consensus preserving pooling function F : P n X ! P X is not neutral.
The situation changes once we further relax the consensus principle, namely to its simplest version familiar from the literature ('consensus preservation'). The class of agendas for which neutrality follows shrinks considerably, namely to the class of pathconnected agendas. The agenda condition of pathconnectedness plays an important role in judgment aggregation theory, where it was introduced by Nehring and Puppe (2010) (under the name of 'total blockedness') and used for instance to generalize Arrow's Theorem List 2007, Dokow and Holzman 2010) . Formally, given the agenda X, we say that an event A 2 X conditionally entails another B 2 X, in symbols A` B, if there exists a subset The agenda X is pathconnected if any two events A; B 2 Xnf?; g can be connected by a path of conditional entailments, i.e., there exist events A 1 ; ::
For instance, if the set of worlds is = R, the agenda X := fA; A c : A R is a bounded intervalg is a pathconnected. For instance, there is a path of conditional entailments from Many agendas are not pathconnected, including the agenda of our climate committee and all nested agendas X (6 = f?; g). For such agendas, neutrality does not follow. The following theorem formally states our result.
Theorem 3 (a) For any pathconnected agenda X, all independent and consensus preserving pooling functions F : P n X ! P X are neutral. (b) For any non-pathconnected (…nite) agenda X, some independent and consensus preserving pooling function F : P n X ! P X is not neutral.
In the rest of this section, we outline the proof of Theorems 1-3. (Details are given in the appendix.) We begin by part (a) of each theorem. Theorem 1(a) follows from Theorem 2(a), since both results consider the same agendas but Theorem 1(a) assumes a stronger consensus principle. To prove Theorem 2(a), we de…ne a binary relation on the set of all contingent events in the agenda. First recall that two events A; B are exclusive if A \ B = ? and exhaustive if A [ B = . Now, for any events A; B 2 Xnf?; g, we de…ne
there is a …nite sequence A 1 ; :::; A k 2 X with A 1 = A and A k = B such that any adjacent A j ; A j+1 are neither exclusive nor exhaustive.
Theorem 2(a) follows from the following two lemmas (proved in the appendix).
Lemma 1 For any agenda X (6 = f?; g), the relation is an equivalence relation on Xnf?; g, with exactly two equivalence classes if X is nested, and exactly one if X is non-nested.
Lemma 2 For any agenda X (6 = f?; g), an independent and conditional consensus preserving pooling function is neutral on each equivalence class with respect to (i.e., the pooling criterion is the same for any equivalent events).
The proof of Theorem 3(a) draws on the following lemma (broadly analogous to a lemma in judgment aggregation theory; e.g., Puppe 2010 and List 2007) .
Lemma 3 For any independent and consensus preserving pooling function, and all events A and B in the agenda X, if A` B then D A D B (where D A and D B are the local pooling criteria for A and B, respectively).
To see why Theorem 3(a) follows, simply note that D A D B whenever there is a path of conditional entailments from A 2 X to B 2 X (by repeated application of Lemma 3); thus, D A = D B whenever there are paths in both directions, as is guaranteed to be the case if the agenda is pathconnected and A; B 6 2 f?; g.
Part (b) of each of the theorems can be proved by explicitly constructing a non-neutral pooling function -for an agenda of the relevant kind -which is independent and obeys the consensus principle in question. In the case of Theorem 3(b), this pooling function is very complex. In the case of Theorems 1(a) and 1(b), the idea can be conveyed informally. Recall that a nested agenda X can be partitioned into two subsets, X + and XnX + = fA c : A 2 X + g, each of which is nested by set-inclusion. The opinion pooling function constructed has the property that (i) all events A in X + have the same pooling criterion D = D A , de…nable for example as the square of a linear pooling criterion, and (ii) all remaining events in XnX + have the same 'complementary' pooling criterion D , de…ned by D (x 1 ; :::; x n ) = 1 D(1 x 1 ; :::; 1 x n ) for all (x 1 ; :::; x n ) 2 [0; 1] n . The construction and veri…cation of the relevant properties involve some technicality, partly because we allow the agenda to have any cardinality.
6 When must pooling be linear?
As we have just seen, many agendas force all independent pooling functions which respect consensus (in one of three senses) to be neutral. But must these pooling functions even be linear? As we now show, the answer depends on the agenda, in a clear-cut way. In short, if in each of Theorems 1-3 we suitably restrict the class of agendas considered in part (a), then we can derive linearity rather than just neutrality. Correspondingly, in part (b) of each theorem we can expand the class of agendas considered, and replace non-neutrality by non-linearity.
As in the previous section, we start with the case that consensus must be respected in the strongest of the three senses (unrevealed consensus preservation).
While neutrality follows for all nested agendas (by Theorem 1), linearity follows for all not very small nested agendas:
Theorem 4 (a) For any non-nested agenda X with jXnf ; ?gj > 4, all independent and unrevealed consensus preserving pooling functions F : P n X ! P X are linear.
(b) For any other agenda X ( 6 = f?; g), some independent and unrevealed consensus preserving pooling function F : P n X ! P X is not linear.
Next, consider the case that consensus must be respected only in the weaker sense of conditional consensus preservation. While neutrality follows for all nested agendas (by Theorem 2), linearity follows for all non-simple agendas. Such agendas once again play a crucial role in judgment aggregation theory Puppe 2010, Dietrich and List 2007) . To introduce these agendas, recall that a set of events Y is minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent but every proper subset Y 0 ( Y is consistent. Examples of minimal inconsistent sets are fA; B; (A \ B) c g, where A and B are logically independent events, and fA; A ! B; B c g, with A; B; A ! B as de…ned in the expert committee example above. In each case, the three events are mutually inconsistent, but any two of them are mutually consistent. The notion of a minimal inconsistent set is useful for characterizing logical dependencies between the events in the agenda. Trivial examples of minimal inconsistent subsets of the agenda are those of the form fA; A c g X, where A is contingent, but many interesting agendas have more complex minimal inconsistent subsets. One may regard sup Y X:Y is minimal inconsistent jY j as a measure of the complexity of the logical dependencies in the agenda X. Given this idea, it is natural to call an agenda X non-simple if it has at least one minimal inconsistent subset Y X containing more than two events (more precisely, more than two but not uncountably many events 9 ). Otherwise the agenda is simple. For instance, the agenda consisting of A; A ! B; B and complements in our expert committee example is non-simple (take Y = fA; A ! B; B c g). Non-simplicity is logically between non-nestedness and pathconnectedness: it implies non-nestedness, and follows from pathconnectedness (if X 6 = f ; ?g).
10
9 In practice, this countability addition can usually be dropped, because typically all minimal inconsistent sets Y X are automatically …nite or at least countable. It can for instance be dropped if X is …nite or countably in…nite, and also if the underlying set of worlds is countable. It can further be dropped in the (frequent) case that the events in X represent sentences in a language: then, provided this language belongs to a compact logic, all minimal inconsistent sets Y X are …nite (because any inconsistent set has a …nite inconsistent subset). By contrast, if X is a -algebra and has in…nite cardinality, then it usually contains events not representing sentences, because countably in…nite disjunctions cannot be formed in a language. Such agendas often have uncountable minimal inconsistent subsets. For instance, if X is the -algebra of Borel-measurable subsets of R, then its subset Y = fRnfxg : x 2 Rg is uncountable and minimal inconsistent. This agenda is nonetheless non-simple, since it also has many …nite minimal inconsistent subsets Y with jY j 3 (e.g., Y = ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f2; 3gg).
10 To give an example of a non-nested but simple agenda X, let X = fA; A c ; B; B c g, where
To understand how exactly non-simplicity strengthens non-nestedness, it is useful to know that the non-nestedness condition can be re-stated as the following condition only subtly distinct from the de…nition of non-simplicity (as proved in the appendix): the agenda has a subset Y with jY j 3 such that (Y nfAg) [ fA c g is consistent for each A 2 Y .
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To turn this characterization of non-nestedness into one of non-simplicity, it su¢ ces to strengthen 'subset Y 'to 'inconsistent subset Y (of countable cardinality)'.
Theorem 5 (a) For any non-simple agenda X, all independent and conditional consensus preserving pooling functions F : P n X ! P X are linear. (b) For any simple agenda X (…nite and not f?; g), some independent and conditional consensus preserving pooling function F : P n X ! P X is not linear.
Finally, we turn to the weakest consensus principle, consensus preservation simpliciter. Here, neutrality follows once the agenda is pathconnected (see Theorem 3(a)). To obtain the stronger linearity conclusion, we require the agenda to be not just pathconnected, but also 'partitional'. We call agenda X partitional if it has a subset Y which partitions into at least three non-empty events (where Y is …nite or countably in…nite); otherwise, X is non-partitional. For instance, X is partitional if it contains (non-empty) events A; A c \ B and A c \ B c : simply let
Theorem 6 (a) For any pathconnected and partitional agenda X, all independent and consensus preserving pooling functions F : P n X ! P X are linear. (b) For any non-pathconnected (…nite) agenda X, some independent and consensus preserving pooling function F : P n X ! P X is not linear.
Part (b) shows that one of the two agenda conditions, pathconnectedness, is necessary for linearity to follow (which comes as no surprise since it is even necessary for neutrality to follow by Theorem 3). By contrast, the other agenda condition, partitionality, is certainly not necessary: linearity also follows for some non-partitional (pathconnected) agendas. So, the agenda conditions of part (a) are non-minimal. The task of …nding the minimal agenda conditions is left for future research. 12 the events A and B are logically independent, i.e., A \ B; A \ B c ; A c \ B; A c \ B c 6 = ?. Clearly, this agenda is non-nested. It is simple since its only minimal inconsistent subsets are fA; A c g and fB; B c g. 11 This characterization of non-nestedness assumes that the agenda X is not very small, i.e., jXnf ; ?gj > 4.
12 A generalized de…nition of partitionality is possible in Theorem 6: we could de…ne agenda While the partitionality condition is not logically minimal for linearity to follow, it is not altogether redundant, i.e., it could not be dropped in Theorem 6. This follows from the following (non-trivial) proposition:
Proposition 2 For some pathconnected and non-partitional (…nite) agenda X, some independent (in fact, neutral) and consensus preserving pooling function F : P n X ! P X is not linear.
13
Readers familiar with judgment aggregation theory will notice that the agenda which we construct to prove this proposition violates an important agenda property of that theory, namely even-number negatability (see Dietrich 2007 , Dietrich and List 2007 , Dokow and Holzman 2010 . It would be intriguing if that same property turned out to be the relevant condition to which we must weaken partitionality in order to obtain logically minimal agenda conditions in Theorem 6.
We now outline how Theorems 4-6 can be proved (see the appendix for details). We begin by part (a) of each theorem. To show Theorem 4(a), consider a non-nested agenda X with jXnf ; ?gj > 4 and an independent and unrevealed consensus preserving pooling function F . We need to show linearity. Neutrality already follows from Theorem 1(a). From neutrality we can infer linearity by using the following two lemmas. The …rst lemma contains the bulk of the work, and the second is an application of Cauchy's functional equation made similarly by Aczél and Wagner (1980) and McConway (1981) . X as partitional if there is a subset Y X and an intersection C of events in X such that fA \ C : A 2 Y g partitions C into at least three non-empty events (where each of Y and C is …nite or countably in…nite). This de…nition is more general since if we take C to be (= \ B2? B) then Y simply partitions . But since we do not know whether this generalized de…nition renders partitionality logically minimal in Theorem 6, we use the simpler de…nition in the main text.
13 Assuming the underlying set of worlds is not very small, i.e., j j 4.
The proof of Theorem 5(a) follows a similar strategy, but replaces Lemma 4 by the following lemma:
is the local pooling criterion of a neutral and conditional consensus preserving pooling function for a non-simple agenda X, then (2) holds.
Finally, Theorem 6(a) can again be proved using a similar strategy, this time replacing Lemma 4 by the following lemma:
is the local pooling criterion of a neutral and consensus preserving pooling function for a partitional agenda X, then (2) holds.
As for part (b) of Theorems 4-6, each proof can be done by constructing a concrete non-linear 'solution'. In the case of Theorem 4(b), we can re-use the non-neutral 'solution'constructed to prove Theorem 1(b) as long as the agenda satis…es jXnf ; ?gj > 4; for (small) agendas with jXnf ; ?gj 4, we construct a somewhat simplistic pooling function generating collective opinion functions that only assign probabilities of 0, 
Classical results on opinion pooling as special cases
It is instructive to see how our present results generalize classic results in the literature when the agenda is a -algebra (in particular, Aczél and Wagner 1980 and McConway 1981) . For such agendas, our various agenda conditions, such as non-nestedness, reduce to a simple condition on agenda size, by following fact, whose veri…cation is left to the reader:
Lemma 8 For any agenda X (6 = f ; ?g) closed under pairwise union (or intersection), i.e., any algebra agenda, the agenda conditions of non-nestedness, non-simplicity, pathconnectedness and partitionality are all equivalent, and they hold if and only if jXj > 4.
Not only our agenda conditions, but also our various consensus principles become equivalent for 'classical' -algebra agendas X (see Proposition 1(a)). It follows that, for the special case of a -algebra agenda X, our six theorems reduce to two classical results:
Theorems 1-3 all reduce to the result that independent and consensus preserving pooling must be neutral if jXj > 4, but not if jXj = 4; Theorems 4-6 all reduce to the result that independent and consensus preserving pooling must be linear if jXj > 4, but not if jXj = 4.
Note that the case jXj < 4 is uninteresting as it means that X = f?; g given that X is a -algebra. In fact, we obtain these classical theorems slightly more generally for algebra (rather than -algebra) agendas, since Theorems 3 and 6 imply the following statements given Lemma 8:
Corollary 1 For any agenda X closed under pairwise union (or intersection), i.e., any algebra agenda, (a) if jXj > 4, all independent and consensus preserving pooling functions are linear (hence, neutral); (b) if jXj = 4, some independent and consensus preserving pooling function is non-neutral (hence, non-linear).
An illustrative application: probabilistic preference aggregation
To illustrate the use of general agendas, let us apply our results to a rather di¤er-ent context, namely that of probabilistic preference aggregation -a probabilistic analogue of Arrow's preference aggregation problem. A group faces a set K of at least two (mutually exclusive and exhaustive) alternatives, and seeks to form a collective view on how to rank them in a linear order. Let K be the set of all strict orderings over K (asymmetric, transitive and connected binary relations). Informally, K can represent any set of distinct objects, e.g., policy options, candidates, social states, distributions of goods, or artifacts, and an ordering over K can have any interpretation consistent with a linear form (e.g., 'better than', 'preferable to', 'higher than', 'more competent than', 'less unequal than'etc.). Now, for any alternatives x 6 = y in K, let x y denote the event that x ranks above y in the 'true'ordering; that is, x y denotes the subset of K consisting of all those orderings in K in which x is ranked above y. The preference agenda is simply de…ned as the set X K = fx y : x; y 2 K with x 6 = yg; which is of course non-empty and closed under complement, as required for an agenda.the agent's degrees of belief about which of the various pairwise comparisons x y (2 X K ) are 'correct'; call this the belief interpretation. So, for any distinct alternatives x; y 2 K, P (x y) can be interpreted as the agent's degree of belief in the event x y that x is better (or higher, ...) than y. (On an entirely di¤erent interpretation, the vague-preference interpretation, P (x y) could represent the degree to which the agent prefers x to y, so that the present framework would capture vague preferences over alternatives as opposed to degrees of belief about how they are ranked in terms of the appropriate linear criterion.) A pooling function, as de…ned above, maps n individual such opinion functions to a single collective one.
What are the structural properties of this preference agenda?
Lemma 9 For the preference agenda X K , the conditions of non-nestedness, nonsimplicity and pathconnectedness are equivalent, and hold if and only if jKj > 2; the condition of partitionality is violated (whatever the size of K).
The proof that the preference agenda is non-nested if and only if jKj > 2 is trivial. The analogous equivalences for non-simplicity and pathconnectedness are well-established in judgment aggregation theory, to which the reader is referred. 15 Finally, non-partitionality is easily shown.
Given that the preference agenda is non-nested and non-simple (provided there are more than two alternatives), Theorems 1(a), 2(a), 4(a) and 5(a) apply; but Theorems 3(a) and 6(a) do not, by non-partitionality. Let us here focus on how Theorem 5 applies. This theorem takes the following form for the preference agenda:
Corollary 2 For the preference agenda X K , (a) if jKj > 2, all independent and conditional consensus preserving pooling functions are linear; (b) if jKj = 2, some independent and conditional consensus preserving pooling function is not linear.
It is useful to compare this result to Arrow's Theorem. While Arrow's Theorem reaches a dictatorial conclusion if jKj > 2, our linearity conclusion does not have an undemocratic ‡avour. As for our axiomatic requirements, they are comparable to Arrow's. Indeed, our independence condition requires that, for any pair of distinct alternatives x; y 2 K, the collective probability for x y depend only on individual probabilities for x y: the probabilistic analogue of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives. Conditional consensus preservation requires that, for any two pairs of distinct alternatives, x; y 2 K and v; w 2 K, if all individuals are certain that x y given that v w, then this agreement be preserved at the collective level: a strengthened probabilistic analogue of the weak Pareto principle (an exact analogue would be consensus preservation). The analogues of Arrow's universal domain and collective rationality conditions are built into our de…nition of a pooling function, whose domain and co-domain are de…ned by the set of all (by de…nition coherent) opinion functions over X K .
This points towards an alternative escape-route from Arrow's impossibility theorem (though it may be practically applicable only in special contexts): if Arrow's informational framework is enriched so as to allow degrees of belief of betterness as input and output of the aggregation (or alternatively, vague preferences, understood probabilistically), then Arrow's dictatorship conclusion can be avoided. Instead, we obtain a positive characterization of linear pooling, despite imposing conditions on the pooling function that are stronger than Arrow's classic conditions (in so far as conditional consensus preservation is stronger than the analogue of the weak Pareto principle).
On the belief interpretation, the informational framework employed here is meaningful so long as there exists a fact of the matter about which of the orderings in K is the 'correct'one (e.g., an objective quality ordering), so that it makes sense to form beliefs about this fact. On the vague-preference interpretation, our framework requires that vague preferences over pairs of alternatives are extendible to a coherent probability distribution over the set of 'crisp'orderings in K .
There are, of course, substantial bodies of literature on avoiding Arrow's dictatorial conclusion in richer informational frameworks and on probabilistic or vague preference aggregation. It is well known that the introduction of interpersonally comparable preferences (of an ordinal or cardinal type) is su¢ cient for avoiding Arrow's conclusion (e.g., Sen 1970 Sen /1979 . Also, di¤erent models of probabilistic or vague preference aggregation have been investigated. A model in which individuals and the collective each specify probabilities of selecting each of the alternatives in K (as opposed to a probabilities of betterness comparisons of the type 'x is better than y') has been investigated, for example, by Intriligator (1973) , who has characterized a version of linear averaging in it. A model in which individuals have vague or fuzzy preferences in the sense that, for any pair of alternatives x; y 2 K, each individual prefers x to y to a certain degree between 0 and 1 has been investigated, for example, by Billot (1991) and more recently by Piggins and Perote-Peña (2007) (see also Sanver and Selçuk 2009), but the standard constraints on vague or fuzzy preferences do not require individuals to hold 'probabilistically coherent' opinion functions in our present sense; hence the literature has tended to generate Arrow-style impossibility results. By contrast, it is illuminating to see that a possibility result on probabilistic preference aggregation can be derived as a corollary of one of our new results on opinion pooling.
A Proofs
In this appendix, we prove all our results. Given the close mathematical connection between the present results and those in the companion paper Dietrich and List (2013b) about premise-based opinion pooling for a -algebra agenda, there are in principle two plausible proof strategies: either we prove our present results directly and those in the companion paper as corollaries, or vice versa. As it turns out, mixing these two strategies is the most natural approach. The parts (a) of most present theorems will be proved directly (and used in the companion paper to prove results stated there), while the parts (b) of most present theorems will be derived from corresponding results in the companion paper. Section A.1 provides some preparatory lemmas needed to translate between results in this paper and results in the companion paper. Section A.2 contains the proof of Theorem 1, Section A.3 the proof of Theorems 2 (and related results), and so on until Section A.7, which contains the proof of Theorems 6. Finally, Section A.8 contains the proof of Proposition 2.
A.1 The relationship to premise-based opinion pooling for a classical -algebra agenda
We now relate opinion pooling on a general agenda X to opinion pooling on a -algebra agenda, as analysed in the companion paper. This technical connection will be exploited in our proofs.
Consider any agenda X, and any -algebra agenda of which X is a subagenda. (A subagenda of an agenda is a subset which is itself an agenda, i.e., a non-empty set closed under taking complements.) For instance, could be (X). We can think of the pooling function F for X as being induced by a pooling function F for the larger agenda . Formally, a pooling function F : P n ! P for agenda is said to induce the pooling function F : P n X ! P X for (sub)agenda X if F and F generate the same collective opinions within X, i.e., F (P 1 j X ; :::; P n j X ) = F (P 1 ; :::; P n )j X for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P (and if moreover P X = fP j X : P 2 P g, an addition which holds automatically in standard cases, i.e., if X is …nite or (X) = 16 ). Our axiomatic requirements on the pooling function F -i.e., independence and the various consensus principles -can be related to the following axiomatic requirements on the inducing pooling function F for the agenda (introduced and discussed in the companion paper):
Independence on X. For each A in subagenda X, there exists a function D A : [0; 1] n ! [0; 1] (the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D A (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)).
Consensus preservation. For all A 2 and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , if P i (A) = 1 for all individuals i then P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = 1.
Consensus preservation on X. For all A in subagenda X and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , if P i (A) = 1 for all individuals i then P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = 1.
Conditional consensus preservation on X. For all A; B in subagenda X and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , if for each individual i P i (AjB) = 1 (provided P i (B) 6 = 0), then also P P 1 ;:::;Pn (AjB) = 1 (provided P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B) 6 = 0).
17
16 because in these cases each opinion function in P X is extendible not just to a probability measure on (X), but even to one on . In the general case, extensions beyond (X) may not always be possible, as is well-known from measure theory. For instance, if = R, X consists of all intervals or complements thereof, and = 2 R , then (X) contains the Borel-measurable subsets of R, and it is well-known that measures on (X) may not extend to = 2 R (a fact related to the Banach-Tarski paradox).
17 When comparing this condition to the earlier condition of conditional consensus preservation for a general agenda X, one might wonder why the new condition involves only a single conditional certainty (i.e., that of A given B), whereas the earlier condition involves a whole
The following lemma shows how properties of the inducing pooling function relate to properties of the induced pooling function.
Lemma 10 Suppose pooling function F for -algebra agenda induces pooling function F for subagenda X (where X is …nite or (X) = ). Then:
F is independent (resp. neutral, linear) if and only if F is independent (resp. neutral, linear) on X, F is consensus preserving if and only if F is consensus preserving on X, F is unrevealed consensus preserving if F is consensus preserving, F is conditional consensus preserving if F is conditional consensus preserving on X.
This lemma is in fact a corollary of the following more general result on the correspondence between opinion pooling on a general agenda and classical opinion pooling on a larger -algebra agenda.
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Lemma 11 Consider an agenda X and the corresponding -algebra agenda = (X). Any pooling function for X is (a) induced by some pooling function for agenda , (b) independent (resp. neutral, linear) if and only if every inducing pooling function for agenda is independent (resp. neutral, linear) on X, where moreover 'every'can be replaced by 'some', (c) consensus preserving if and only if every inducing pooling function for agenda is consensus preserving on X, where moreover 'every'can be replaced by 'some', (d) unrevealed consensus preserving if and only if some inducing pooling function for agenda is consensus preserving, (e) conditional consensus preserving if and only if some inducing pooling function for agenda is conditional consensus preserving on X (where in (d) and (e) the 'only if'claim assumes that X is …nite).
The proof of Lemma 11 draws on the following measure-theoretic fact (in which the word '…nite'is essential):
Lemma 12 Every probability function on a …nite sub--algebra of -algebra can be extended to a probability function on .
set of conditional certainties, all of which should be respected simultaneously. The point to realize is that in the current condition there is no need for the complication of a set of conditional certainties, since our current condition as formulated implies preservation of any set of unanimously held conditional certainties involving events in X.
18 More precisely, Lemma 10 is a corollary of a slightly generalized statement of Lemma 11, in which is either (X) or, if X is …nite, any -algebra which includes X. Our proof of Lemma 11 can be extended to this generalized statement (drawing on Lemma 12 and using an argument related to the 'Claim'in the proof of Theorem 1(b) of the companion paper).
Proof. Let 0 be a …nite sub--algebra of -algebra , and consider any P 0 2 P 0 . Let A be the set of atoms of 0 , i.e., of ( -)minimal events in 0 nf?g. Using the fact that 0 is …nite, it easily follows that A partitions . So, X A2A P 0 (A) = 1. For each A 2 A let Q A be a probability function on such that Q A (A) = 1. (Such functions exist, since each Q A could for instance be the Dirac measure in a point ! A 2 A.) Then
de…nes a probability function on , because (by the identity X A2A:P 0 (A)6 =0 P 0 (A) = 1) it is a convex combination of probability functions on . Further, P extends P 0 because it agrees with P 0 on A, hence on all of 0 .
Proof of Lemma 11. Consider an agenda X, the generated -algebra = (X), and a pooling function F for X.
(a) For each P 2 P X , …x any extension in P , to be denoted P . Consider the pooling function F for de…ned by F (P 1 ; :::; P n ) = F (P 1 j X ; :::; P n j X ) for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P .
Clearly, F induces F (regardless of how the extensions P of P 2 P X were chosen).
(b) We give a proof for the 'independence'case; the proofs for the 'neutrality' and 'linearity' cases are analogous. Note (using part (a)) that replacing 'every' by 'some'strengthens the 'if'claim and weakens the 'only if'claim. It therefore su¢ ces to prove the 'if'claim with 'some', and the 'only if'claim with 'every'.
First let F be independent with pooling criteria D A ; A 2 X. Consider any F : P n ! P n inducing F . Then F is independent on X with the same pooling criteria as for F , because for all A 2 X and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P we have F (P 1 ; :::; P n )(A) = F (P 1 j X ; :::; P n j X )(A) as F induces F = D A (P 1 j X (A); :::; P n j X (A)) by F 's independence = D A (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)).
Now suppose some inducing pooling function F is independent on X. Clearly, F inherits independence from F .
(c) As in part (b), replacing 'every'by 'some'strengthens the 'if'claim and weakens the 'only if'claim, so that it su¢ ces to prove the 'if'claim with 'some', and the 'only if' claim with 'every'. First, let F be consensus preserving, and consider any inducing F . Then F is consensus preserving on X because for all A 2 X and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P such that P 1 (A) = = P n (A) = 1 we have F (P 1 ; :::; P n )(A) = F (P 1 j X ; :::; P n j X )(A) as F induces F = 1 as F is consensus preserving. Now suppose some inducing F is consensus preserving on X. It is clear that F inherits consensus preservation from F .
(d) First, let F be unrevealed consensus preserving, and let X be …nite. We de…ne F as follows. For any pro…le P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , we …rst form the event A in which is smallest (with respect to set-inclusion) subject to having probability one under each P i ; to see why this event exists, note that the intersection of …nitely many events of probability one has probability one, so that (since = (X) is …nite) we can construct A as the intersection \ A2 (X):P 1 (A)= =P n (A)=1 A. In other words, A is the union of the supports of the measures P i . We de…ne F (P 1 ; :::; P n ) as any extension in P of F (A 1 j X ; ::::; A n j X ) assigning probability one to A . Such an extension exists because F is unrevealed consensus preserving and each P i j X is extendible to a measure (namely P i ) assigning probability one to A . The so-de…ned pooling function F clearly induces F . It is also consensus preserving since, for any P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P and any event A 2 , if P 1 (A) = = P n (A) = 1, then A A (where A is the event constructed as above), and thus F (P 1 ; :::; P n )(A) = 1 since F (P 1 ; :::; P n )(A ) = 1.
Conversely, assume some inducing F is consensus preserving. To see why F is unrevealed consensus preserving, we consider any P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X and any A 2 such that each P i has an extension P i 2 P for which P i (A) = 1. We have to show that there is an extension P 2 P of F (P 1 ; :::; P n ) such that P (A) = 1. Simply de…ne P as F (P 1 ; :::; P n ) and note that it is indeed the case that (i) P extends F (P 1 ; :::; P n ), since F induces F , and (ii) P (A) = 1 since F is consensus preserving.
(e) First, let F be conditional consensus preserving and X be …nite. We de…ne F as follows. For any pro…le (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 2 P n , …rst form the (…nite) set S of all pairs (A; B) in X such that P i (AjB) = 1 for each i with P i (B) 6 = 0 (equivalently, such that P i (BnA) = 0 for each i). By the conditional consensus preservation of F (and the fact that in the last sentence we could of course have replaced each 'P i ' by 'P i j X '), there is an extension P 2 P of F (P 1 j X ; :::; P n j X ) such that P (AjB) = 1 for all (A; B) 2 S for which P (B) 6 = 0. We de…ne F (P 1 ; :::; P n ) as P . Clearly, F induces F and is conditional consensus preserving on X.
Conversely, let some inducing F be conditional consensus preserving on X. To check that F is conditional consensus preserving, consider any P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X and any …nite set S of pairs (A; B) in X such that each P i extends to a P i 2 P with P i (AjB) = 1 (provided P i (B) 6 = 0). We need to …nd an extension P 2 P of F (P 1 ; :::; P n ) such that P (AjB) = 1 for all (A; B) 2 S for which P (B) 6 = 0. The measure P := F (P 1 ; :::; P n ) is such an extension, because F induces F and is conditional consensus preserving on X.
Given a pooling function F for the -algebra agenda , does it induce any pooling function for subagenda X? The following result gives a su¢ cient condition.
Lemma 13 If a pooling function for a -algebra agenda is independent on a subagenda X (where X is …nite or (X) = ), then it induces a pooling function for agenda X.
Proof of Lemma 13. Suppose pooling function F for -algebra agenda is independent on the subagenda X, and that X is …nite or (X) = . Let 0 := (X). Notice that if X is …nite, so is 0 . Each P 2 P X by de…nition extends to a function in P 0 , which, using Lemma 12 if 0 is a (…nite) -algebra distinct from , extends to a function in P . For any Q 2 P X let Q 2 P be an extension. De…ne a pooling function F 0 for X by F 0 (Q 1 ; :::; Q n ) := F (Q 1 ; :::; Q n )j X for all Q 1 ; :::; Q n 2 P X . Now F induces F 0 for the following two reasons. First, for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P F 0 (P 1 j X ; :::; P n j X ) = F (P 1 j X ; :::; P n j X )j X = F (P 1 ; :::; P n )j X (as F is independent on X).
Second, the identity P X = fP j X : P 2 P g holds: ' ' is trivial, and ' ' holds because each P 2 P X can be written as P j X .
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. (a) This part follows from Theorem 2(a), since unrevealed consensus preservation implies conditional consensus preservation.
(b) We reduce this part to the companion paper's Theorem 1(b). Consider a nested agenda X 6 = f?; g. By the companion paper's Theorem 1(b) (see also the footnote to that theorem), there is a pooling function F for the agenda := (X) which is independent on X, (globally) consensus preserving, but not neutral on X. By independence on X, this pooling function induces a pooling function for the (sub)agenda X (see Lemma 13). This pooling function is independent and unrevealed consensus preserving and not neutral (see Lemma 10).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
As mentioned, Theorem 2(a) is based on the above Lemmas 1 and 2. To prove these, we …rst show the following lemma.
Lemma 14 Consider any agenda X. (d) Let X 6 = f?; g. Suppose the number of equivalence classes with respect to is not one. As Xnf?; g 6 = ?, it is not zero. So it is at least two. We show two claims: Claim 1. There are exactly two equivalence classes with respect to . Proof of Lemma 1. Consider an agenda X 6 = f?; g. By Lemma 14(a), is indeed an equivalence relation on Xnf?; g. By Lemma 14(d), it remains to prove that X is nested if and only if there are exactly two equivalence classes. Note that X is nested if and only if Xnf?; g is nested, so that we may assume without loss of generality that ?; = 2 X.
First suppose there are two equivalence classes with respect to . Let X + be one of them. By Lemma 14(d), X = fA; A c : A 2 X + g. To complete the proof that X is nested, we show that X + is linearly ordered by set-inclusion . As is of course re ‡exive, transitive and anti-symmetric, what we have to show is connectedness. So suppose A; B 2 X + , and let us show that A B or B
A.
In the …rst case, A B. In the second case, B A.
Conversely, let X be nested, i.e., of the form X = fA; A c : A 2 X + g for some set X + that is linearly ordered by set-inclusion . Consider any A 2 X + . We show that A 6 A c , which shows that X has more than one, hence by Lemma 14(d) exactly two equivalence classes with respect to , as desired. For a contradiction, suppose A A c . Then there is a path A 1 ; :::; A k 2 X from A = A 1 to A c = A k such that, for all neighbours A j ; A j+1 , A j \ A j+1 6 = ? and A j [ A j+1 6 = . As each event C 2 X is either in X + or has complement in X + , and as
A j . In the …rst case, A j \ A j+1 = ?, a contradiction. In the second case, A j [ A j+1 = , also a contradiction.
Before proving Lemma 2, we give a useful re-formulation of the condition of conditional consensus preservation for opinion pooling on a general agenda X. Note …rst that an opinion function is consistent with certainty of A (2 X) given B (2 X) if and only if it is consistent with certainty of the event 'B implies A', i.e., with zero probability of BnA, the event that B holds without A. So, conditional consensus preservation can be re-formulated as the following condition (in which the roles of A and B have been interchanged):
Implication preservation. For all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , and all …nite sets S of pairs (A; B) of events in X, if every opinion function P i is consistent with certainty that A implies B for all (A; B) in S (i.e., some extension P i 2 P (X) of P i satis…es P i (AnB) = 0 for all pairs (A; B) 2 S), then so is the collective opinion function P P 1 ;:::;Pn .
The following proposition states what has just been (informally) shown:
Proposition 3 For any agenda X, conditional consensus preservation is equivalent to implication preservation.
We are ready to prove Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let F be an independent and conditional consensus preserving pooling function for agenda X. c 6 = ?, there exist probability functions P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P (X) such that
, for all i = 1; :::; n.
Now consider the opinion functions P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X given by P i := P i j X for each individual i. Since P i (AnB) = 0 and P i (BnA) = 0 for all i, the collective opinion function P P 1 ;:::;Pn has an extension P P 1 ;:::;Pn 2 P (X) such that P P 1 ;:::;Pn (AnB) = P P 1 ;:::;Pn (BnA) = 0 by implication preservation (which is equivalent to conditional consensus preservation by Proposition 3). It follows that P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A \ B) = P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B).
Hence, P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B).
So, using the fact that P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D A (x) (because P i (A) = x i for all i) and P P 1 ;:::; 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Lemma 3. Let F : P n X ! P X be independent and consensus preserving, and consider A; B 2 X. Suppose A` B, say in virtue of (countable) 
where ! ; ! 0 : (X) ! [0; 1] denote the Dirac-measures in ! and ! 0 , respectively; and consider the opinion function P i := P i j X . As each P i satis…es P i (A) = P i (B) = x i , we have P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D A (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)) = D A (x), P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B) = D B (P 1 (B); :::; P n (B)) = D B (x).
Further, for each P i and each C 2 Y we have P i (C) = 1, so that P P 1 ;:::;Pn (C) = 1 (by consensus preservation), and hence P P 1 ;:::;Pn (\ C2Y C) = 1 since the intersection of countably many events of probability one has again probability one. So So, to prove that D A (x) D B (x) it su¢ ces to show that P P 1 ;:::;Pn (\ C2fAg[Y C) P P 1 ;:::;Pn (\ C2fBg[Y C). This is true because
where the equality holds by an earlier argument.
Proof of Theorem 3. (a) Let X be pathconnected and F independent and consensus preserving. We show neutrality. Without loss of generality let X 6 = f?; g. We write D A for the local pooling criterion of any contingent event A 2 Xnf?; g. As X is pathconnected, repeated application of Lemma 3 yields (b) This part is reducible to the companion paper's Theorem 3(b). Consider a non-pathconnected …nite agenda X. By the companion paper's Theorem 3(b), there is a pooling function F for agenda := (X) which, on X, is independent and consensus preserving but not neutral. By independence on X, this pooling function induces a pooling function for (sub)agenda X (see Lemma 13), which is independent and consensus preserving but not neutral (see Lemma 10).
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 4(a) (speci…cally, of Lemma 4) draws on the following agenda characterization result. subset of X which contains exactly one member of each pair A; A c 2 X and is linearly ordered w.r.t. set-inclusion.
Claim 2.2. There exists D 2 XnX such that D \ A 6 = ? for all A 2 X + .
Since X is nested but X is not, we have X ( X, and thus there are C; C c 2 XnX . It su¢ ces to show that at least one of the sets C and C c intersects all A 2 X + . This is true because otherwise there would exist A; A 0 2 X + such that 
To show this, let A 0 2 X + nY 1 and note …rst that (4)). So the augmented (sub-)agenda X [ fD; D c g is nested. This is a contradiction as X is a maximal nested sub-agenda of X. Claim 2.3 is thus established. 
Note that for every event
, which is non-empty as ? 6 2 X.
As mentioned in the main text, Theorem 4(a) is based on Lemmas 4 and 5. To prove these, we …rst show a simple lemma:
is the local pooling criterion of a neutral pooling function for an agenda X (6 = f ; ?g), then Proof of Lemma 15. (a) Note that, as X 6 = f ; ?g, X contains an event A 6 = ?; . For each x 2 [0; 1] n there are (by A 6 = ?; ) opinion functions P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X such that (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)) = x, and hence (P 1 (A c ); :::; P n (A c )) = 1 x, which implies that D(x) + D(1 x) = P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) + P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A c ) = 1; as desired. n with sum 1. By Proposition 4, there exist A; B; C 2 X such that each of the sets
is non-empty. For all individuals i, since x i + y i + z i = 1 and since A ; B ; C are pairwise disjoint non-empty members of (X), there exists a P i 2 P (X) such that
By construction,
Now consider the restriction P i := P i j X for each individual i. For the so-de…ned pro…le (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 2 P n X , we consider the collective opinion function P P 1 ;:::;Pn . The proof is completed by showing two claims. Claim 1. P (A )+P (B )+P (C ) = P (A [B [C ) = 1 for some extension P 2 P (X) of P P 1 ;:::;Pn .
The …rst equality holds for all extensions P 2 P (X) of P , by the pairwise disjointness of the events A ; B ; C . Regarding the second equality, note that each individual i's opinion function P i has an extension P i 2 P (X) for which P i (A [ B [ C ) = 1, so that by unrevealed consensus preservation also P P 1 ;:::;Pn has such an extension.
Consider an extension P 2 P (X) of P P 1 ;:::;Pn of the kind in Claim 1. As P (A [ B [ C ) = 1, and as the intersection of
Since A c 2 X, we further have P (A c ) = P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A c ) = D(P 1 (A c ); :::; P n (A c )),
. This and (6) imply that P (A ) = D(x). By similar arguments, P (B ) = D(y) and P (C ) = D(z). So Claim 2 follows from Claim 1. 
We have D ( 
(by repeated application of (9)), and so (by
w i x i . Applying the latter
Proof of Theorem 4. (a) This part is proved by …rst using Theorem 1(a) to obtain neutrality, and then inferring linearity from Lemmas 4 and 5 (and from Lemma 15(b), which of course applies as unrevealed consensus preservation implies consensus preservation).
(b) Consider any agenda X 6 = f?; g which is nested or satis…es jXnf?; gj 4. If X is nested, the claim follows from Theorem 1(b), since non-neutrality implies non-linearity. Now assume X is non-nested and jXnf?; gj 4. We may assume without loss of generality that ?; 6 2 X (since any independent, unrevealed consensus preserving and non-neutral pooling function for agenda X 0 = Xnf?; g immediately extends to such a pooling function for agenda X). Since jXj 4, and since jXj > 2 (as X is non-nested), we have jXj = 4, say X = fA; A c ; B; B c g. By non-nestedness, A and B are logically independent, i.e., the events A \ B; A \ B c ; A c \ B and A c \ B c are all non-empty. On P n X , consider the function F : (P 1 ; ::; P n ) 7 ! T P 1 , where
We complete the proof by establishing that (i) F maps into P X , i.e., is a proper pooling function, (ii) F is unrevealed consensus preserving, (iii) F is independent, and (iv) F is non-linear.
Claims (iii) and (iv) hold trivially.
Proof of (i): Let P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X and let P := F (P 1 ; :::; P n ) = T P 1 . We need to extend P to a probability measure on (X). For each atom C of (X) (i.e., each C 2 fA \ B; A \ B c ; A c \ B; A c \ B c g, let P C be the (unique) probability measure on (X) which assigns probability one to C. We distinguish between three (exhaustive) cases.
Case 1 : P 1 (E) = 1 for two events E in X. Without loss of generality. assume P 1 (A) = P 1 (B) = 1, and hence, P 1 (A c ) = P 1 (B c ) = 0. It follows that P (A) = P (B) = 1 and P (A c ) = P (B c ) = 0, so that P extends (in fact, uniquely) to a probability measure on (X), namely the measure P A\B .
Case 2 : P 1 (E) = 1 for exactly one event E in X. Without loss of generality. assume P 1 (A) = 1 (hence, P 1 (A c ) = 0) and P 1 (B); P 1 (B c ) 2 (0; 1). It follows that P (A) = 1, P (A c ) = 0 and P (B) = P (B c ) = 1 2
, so that P extends (again, uniquely) to a probability measure on (X), namely the measure
Case 3 : P 1 (E) = 1 for no event E in X. Then P 1 (A); P 1 (A c ); P 1 (B); P 1 (B c ) 2 (0; 1), and so P (A) = P (A c ) = P (B) = P (B c ) = 1 2
. Hence, P extends (this time non-uniquely) to a probability measure on (X), for instance to the measure 
Proof of (ii): Let P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X and consider any C 2 (X) such that each P i extends to some P i 2 P (X) such that P i (C) = 1. (What only matters for us is that P 1 has such an extension, given the de…nition of F .) We have to show that P := F (P 1 ; :::; P n ) = T P 1 is extendible to a P 2 P (X) such that P (C) = 1. We verify the claim in each of the three cases considered in the proof of (i). In Cases 1 and 2, the claim holds because the (unique) extension P 2 P (X) of P has the same support as P 1 . (In fact, in Case 1 P = P 1 .) In Case 3, C must intersect with each event in X (otherwise some event in X would have zero probability under P 1 , in contradiction with Case 3) and include more than one of the atoms A \ B, A \ B c , A c \ B and A c \ B c (again by Case 3). As one easily checks, it follows that
. So, to ensure that the extension P or P satis…es P (C) = 1, it su¢ ces to specify P as 
A.6 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof of Lemma 6. Let D be the local pooling criterion of a neutral and conditional consensus preserving pooling function for non-simple agenda X. Consider any x; y; z 2 [0; 1] n with sum 1. As X is non-simple, there is a (countable) minimal inconsistent set Y X with jY j 3. So there are pairwise distinct A; B; C 2 Y . De…ne
As (X) is closed under countable intersections, A ; B ; C 2 (X). For all i, as x i + y i + z i = 1 and as A ; B ; C are (by Y 's minimal inconsistency) pairwise disjoint non-empty members of (X), there exists a P i 2 P (X) such that
Now consider the restriction P i := P i j X for each individual i. For the so-de…ned pro…le (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 2 P n X , we consider the collective opinion function P := P P 1 ;:::;Pn . We now derive four properties of P (Claims 1-4) , which then allow us to show that D(x) + D(y) + D(z) = 1 (Claim 5), as desired. Claim 1. P (\ E2Y nfA;B;Cg E) = 1 for all extensions P 2 P (X) of P .
For all E 2 Y nfA; B; Cg we have E A [ B [ C , so that by (10) we have P 1 (E) = ::: = P n (E) = 1, and hence P (E) = 1 by consensus preservation (which follows from conditional consensus preservation by Proposition 1(a)). So, for any extension P 2 P (X) of P , we have P (E) = 1 for all E 2 Y nfA; B; Cg, and thus P (\ E2Y nfA;B;Cg E) = 1 since the intersection of countably many events of probability one has probability one.
[ C c ) = 1 for all extensions P 2 P (X) of P .
Consider any extension P 2 P (X) of P . As A \ B \ C is disjoint from the event \ E2Y nfA;B;Cg E, which by Claim 1 has P -probability one, P (A\B\C) = 0.
This implies Claim 2 because
)) = 1 for some extension P 2 P (X) of P .
Consider an extension P 2 P (X) of P of the kind in Claim 4. As P (A [ B [ C ) = 1 by Claim 4, and as the intersection of A c with A [ B [ C is A , we have P (A c ) = P (A ):
Since A c 2 X, we also have P (A c ) = P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A c ) = D(P 1 (A c ); :::; P n (A c )),
where P i (A c ) = P i (A c ) = x i for each individual i. So, P (A c ) = D(x). This and (11) imply that P (A ) = D(x). By similar arguments, P (B ) = D(y) and P (C ) = D(z). So Claim 5 follows from Claim 4.
Proof of Theorem 5. (a) This part is shown by …rst deducing neutrality from Theorem 2(a) (and the fact that non-simple agendas are non-nested), and then inferring linearity from Lemmas 6 and 5 (and from Lemma 15(b), which applies as conditional consensus preservation implies consensus preservation).
(b) This part is reducible to the companion paper's Theorem 5(b). Consider a simple agenda, …nite and not f?; g. By the companion paper's Theorem 5(b), there is a pooling function F for agenda := (X) which, on X, is independent and conditional consensus preserving but not neutral. By its independence on X, it induces a pooling function for (sub)agenda X (see Lemma 13), which is independent and conditional consensus preserving but not neutral (see Lemma 10).
A.7 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof of Lemma 7. Let D be the local pooling criterion for such a pooling function for a partitional agenda X. Consider any x; y; z 2 [0; 1] n with sum 1. Since X is partitional, some countable Y X partitions into at least three (nonempty) events. Choose distinct members A; B; C 2 Y . For all individuals i, since x i + y i + z i = 1 and since A, B and C are pairwise disjoint and non-empty, there exists a P i 2 P X such that P i (A) = x i ; P i (B) = y i ; P i (C) = z i .
We write P for the collective opinion function under this pro…le. Since Y is a countable partition of , and since P extends to a ( -additive) probability measure, P E2Y P (E) = 1. Note that for each E 2 Y nfA; B; Cg we have P (E) = 0 by consensus preservation (as P i (E) = 0 for all i). So, P (A) + P (B) + P (C) = 1. 1. In this part of the proof, we show that X is pathconnected and nonpartitional. Non-partitionality is trivial. To show pathconnectedness, we consider any events A; B 2 X and have to construct a path of conditional entailments from A to B. This is done by distinguishing between three cases.
Case 1 : A = B. Then the path is trivial, since A` A (take Y = ?).
Case 2 : A and B have exactly one world in common. We may then write A = f! A ; !g and B = f! B ; !g with ! A ; ! B ; ! pairwise distinct. We have f! A ; !g` f!g (take Y = ff!; ! 0 gg, where ! 0 is the element of nf! A ; ! B ; !g) and f!g` f! B ; !g (take Y = ?). 2. In this part, we construct a pooling function (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 7 ! P P 1 ;:::;Pn that is independent (in fact, neutral) and consensus preserving, but not linear. As an ingredient to the construction, consider …rst a linear pooling function L : P n X ! P X (for instance the dictatorial one given by (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 7 ! P 1 ). We shall transform L into a non-linear pooling function that is still neutral and consensus preserving. (Such a T indeed exists; e.g. T (x) = 4(x 1=2) 3 + 1=2 for all x 2 [0; 1].)
For any P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , we de…ne the collective probability of any agenda event A 2 X to be P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) := T (L(P 1 ; :::; P n )(A)). We now prove that, for any P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , the just-de…ned function P P 1 ;:::;Pn on X does indeed extend to a probability function on (X) = 2 . This completes the proof, since it shows that we have de…ned a proper pooling function, which is of course neutral (as L is neutral), consensus preserving (as L is consensus preserving and T (1) = 1), and non-linear (as L is linear and T a non-linear transformation).
Consider any probability measure Q on 2 (think of Qj X as L(P 1 ; :::; P n ) for some given P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , and of Q as an extension to a probability measure on 2 ). We show that the transformed function T Qj X extends to a probability measure on 2 . To do so, it su¢ ces to show that there exist real numbers p k = p Q k , k = 1; 2; 3; 4, such that the measure on 2 assigning p k to each f! k g is a probability measure and extends T Qj X , i.e., such that (a) p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ; p 4 0 and p 1 + p 2 + p 3 + p 4 = 1, (b) for all A 2 X, T (Q(A)) = X k:! k 2A p k .
We distinguish three cases.
Case 1 : all of q 12 ; q 13 ; q 23 are all at least 1=2. Then by (i)-(iii) T (q 12 )+T (q 13 )+ T (q 23 ) q 12 + q 13 + q 23 2, as desired.
Case 2 : at least two of q 12 ; q 13 ; q 23 are below 1=2. Then, again using (i)-(iii), T (q 12 ) + T (q 13 ) + T (q 23 ) < 1=2 + 1=2 + 1 = 2, as desired. T (q 13 ) + T (q 23 ) T (q 13 ) + T (q 23 + ).
This inequality may be applied to = 1 q 23 , since q 13 (1 q 23 ) = (q 13 + q 23 + q 12 ) q 12 1 2 q 12 1 = 1 q 12 2 [1=2; 1]; which gives us that T (q 13 ) + T (q 23 ) T (q 13 (1 + q 23 )) + T (1):
On the right hand side of this inequality, we have T (1) = 1 and, by q 13 (1+q 23 ) 1 q 12 and T 's increasingness, T (q 13 (1 + q 23 )) T (1 q 12 ) = 1 T (q 12 ). So we obtain T (q 13 ) + T (q 23 ) 1 + 1 T (q 12 ), i.e., T (q 12 ) + T (q 13 ) + T (q 23 ) 2, as desired.
Claim 2. p k 0 for all k = 1; 2; 3.
We only show that p 1 0, as the proofs for p 2 and p 3 are analogous. We have to prove that t 13 + t 23 t 12 0, i.e., that T (q 13 ) + T (q 23 ) T (q 12 ), or equivalently, that T (q 1 +q 3 ) +T (q 2 +q 3 ) T (q 1 +q 2 ). As T is an increasing function, it su¢ ces to establish T (q 1 ) + T (q 2 ) T (q 1 + q 2 ). Again, we consider three cases. and T (q 2 ) 1 2 T (q 1 ) + T (q 2 + ) , so that (by adding these inequalities)
T (q 1 ) + T (q 2 ) T (q 1 ) + T (q 2 + ).
